July 1, 2003



(Research report written at the Fairbank Center For East Asia Research, Harvard University)

After the new leaders of China emerged during November 2002 to March 2003, it appears that two factors will ultimately guide both China's domestic politics and foreign policy:

1) The balance of power between the new leaders, as well as their individual backgrounds and interests;

2) The willingness of democratic states, led by America, to pursue a long-term policy that will further spur transformation of the Chinese system.

Situation
The new leadership in China is composed of progressive, moderate, and conservative factions that find themselves in a precarious position of coexistence.



A. Background of the members of the Political Bureau's Standing Committee

All nine members of the Political Bureau's Standing Committee [PBSC] have an engineering background. They have all been Communist supporters and beneficiaries of the Party since Mao Zedong's time, and none of them have showed any significant performance during the 25 years of post-Mao reform and opening. In essence, they are the result of a one-party autocratic system; they are technocrats with out-of-date ideas, who emphasize overcautious execution, and the survivors of factional strife in the Party.

After Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European Bloc in 1991, one of the fundamental guiding principles of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP ) has been preventing the rise of a Gorbachev-like reformer among Party leaders. All potential leaders must show as their primary concern loyalty to the one-party autocracy. None of the new leaders in China's upper echelon have ever deviated in the past from the Party line and nor do they now at present.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European Bloc, to a certain degree, China became a Communist island in a democratic sea. The essential goal of CCP is maintaining at any cost its one-party autocracy. Therefore, they need to oppress China's democratic forces, as well as contend with democratic states led by America who wish to see political reform in China. Both the third generation and the new fourth generation of leaders of China share deep-rooted Party loyalty and a commitment to maintaining its power; they put Party interests, regime interests, and personal political interests before all else.

At the moment there does not exist sharp political differences between the progressive and conservative factions among the new leaders of China. The most likely prospect until the next change in leadership in 2007-2008 will be that the progressives pursue a policy of limited reform in order to alleviate some communist maladies . The conservatives will, in turn, approve some less important reforms in order to keep their positions and avoid be labeled obstacles. Thus, both parties will be able to coexist.



B. Structure of the New Leadership

There is a careful balance of power between the progressive and conservative leaders in the new upper echelon of Chinese Communist Party. There is, as well, a balance of power between the new leaders and the old leaders, who still wield considerable power behind the scenes. This makes the current leadership like a company with two CEO's: Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin.

To a certain extent, this is reminiscent of the political structure of Deng Xiaoping's time, when Deng was retired from his Party positions, but still retained his position as head of the Central Military Commission, the apparatus that controls the army. The difference between then and now lies in the fact that:

- There are no distinct reformers among the leaders of the 4th generation. Although Hu Jintao is more or less labeled a progressive, there is a sharp contrast between Hu and the two strongly-minded reformers as General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1980¡¯s, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.
- Jiang Zemin does not enjoy the same prestige nor have the same foundation of power that Deng Xiaoping had.

Therefore, neither Hu Jintao, as the head of the progressives, and Jiang Zemin, as head of the conservatives, can gain a conclusive advantage for themselves. This is borne out by a quick analysis of the breakdown between progressive, moderates, and conservative members of the PBSC. Among the nine members there are:


• 2 Progressives: Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao
• 2 Moderates: Li Changchun and Wu Guanzheng
• 5 Conservatives: Zeng Qinghong, Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Huang Ju and Luo Gan


It is important to note that among the conservatives there will also be different agendas. For example, among the five conservatives of the PBSC, the fifth, Luo Gan, is a prot¨¦g¨¦ of retired Premier Li Peng, and would presumably have different loyalties than the followers of Jiang Zemin.

So the ratio of progressive to moderate to conservative members on the PBSC is 2:2:5, or to look at it another way, 2:2:(4+1).

By the numbers game, the conservatives would appear to easily have the upper hand. However, the balance is maintained because the progressives hold both the top Party and state position(s): General Secretary (Hu Jintao), President (Hu), and Premier (Wen Jiabao). Therefore, although the progressives are a distinct minority on the PBSC, the distribution of power helps them to maintain a balance with the conservative majority.

The conservatives, also not able to gain a clear advantage in the Politburo Standing Committee, are as equally able to restrain the progressives through their several key positions:

- Executive Secretary of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee: this is held by Jiang's former right-hand man, Zeng Qinghong. In this Party position he is second-in-command of daily Party affairs after Hu Jintao.
- Vice-President: in this state position Zeng is able to check Hu's influence at the state level.
- Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People¡¯s Congress: through this state organ Wu Banguo controls the highest legislation.
- Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: Jia Qinglin heads this consultative body, made up primarily of scholars and non-Party members.
- First Vice-Premier: Huang Ju checks Premier Wen in the State Council.
- At last, Luo Gan is in charge of public security, state security, the courts, procuratorate and the prisons.

It is in the next tier of the Communist Party of China, the complete Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, that the conservative faction has a much more decided advantage over the progressive faction.

The Political Bureau
There are 25 members of the Political Bureau, including the nine members of the PBSC. The other 16 non-standing and alternative members to the Politburo are made up of:

• 1 Progressive: Wang Zhaoguo
• 6 Moderates: Wu Yi, Hui Liang Yu, Zhang Lichang, Yu Zhengsheng, Wang LeQuan and Wang Gang
• 9 Conservatives: Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Zeng Peiyang, Zhou Yongkang, He Guoqiang, Liu Yunshan, Liu Qi, Chen Liangyu, and Zhang Dejiang


When you add these totals to the nine members of the PBSC, the new leadership becomes decidedly more conservative. The figures become:
- 3 Progressives: (1 PB +2 PBSC)
- 8 Moderates: (6 PB +2 PBSC)
- 14 Conservative: (9 PB +5 PBSC).
So the ratio of progressive to moderate to conservative members on the PB is 3:8:14.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee
The Secretariat is the principle administrative mechanism of the CCP, and is described as the arms and legs of the Party. Among the 7 members in Secretariat of the Central Committee (five of whom are members of the Politburo), there are
- no progressives,
- 2 Moderates (Wang Gang and He Yong),
- 5 Conservatives (Zeng Qinghong, Zhou Yongkang, He Guoqiang, Liu Yunshan and Xu Caihou)

The ratio of progressive to moderate to conservative members is 0:2:5. From this standpoint, the Secretariat of the Central Committee has become political territory of the conservatives, and this will lend their conservative influence to the new leaders of China. It is clear to see from analyzing a broader cross-section of the Party, that aside from the high-profile Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the rank-and-file in the upper echelon are decidedly conservative.

Three additional men with highly influential positions are also conservative in the vein of Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong.

1. He Guoqiang - member of the Political Bureau and a member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee; head of the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee.
2. Zhou Yongkang - member of the Political Bureau and a member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee, vice secretary of the politics and law commission of CCP Central Committee.
3. Liu Yunshan - member of the Political Bureau and a member of the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee; head of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee.

Importantly, among these three men the conservatives have locked up control of the three mainstays of China's communist political system: they control appointments of high-ranking officials, policemen and official ideology.

In the highest organ of the state administration, the State Council, Premier Wen Jiabao is counted as the only progressive in the third tier of the new leadership. Among his four vice premiers, two of them (Wu Yi and Hui Liangyu) are moderates, and two of them (Huang Ju and Zeng Peiyan) are conservatives. The remaining five commissioners of state (Zhou Yongkang, Cao Gangchuan, Tang Jiaxuan, Hua Jianmin and Chen Zhili) are all conservatives. Therefore, the ratio of progressive to moderate to conservative members is 1:2:7. In the State Council, then, Wen Jiabao effectively lacks any support for which to enact reforms.

The more important base of power in the Communist political system is the army. There are currently three representatives of the military in the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee: Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan and Xu Caihou. They represent the army's special interests and exert strong influence on the new leadership. All three men happen to be supporters of Jiang Zemin.

The Central Military Commission is relatively independent from the PBSC, the Political Bureau, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, or the State Council. This allows Jiang Zemin, as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, to occupy another center of power. Controlling the military is Jiang's trump card; although he controls allegiance from over half the conservatives in the new leadership, a good many throw support behind other leaders.

Like "Yin" (conservative) and "Yang" (progressive), it seems the new leadership was designed to ensure a harmonious balance of power between the progressives and conservatives, as well as followers of both the old leaders and new leaders. Under such balanced structure, no radical reforms can be passed; likewise, the progressives will stall any overly conservative measures.




Suggestions

The coexistence between the progressives and conservatives will last at least for the next four-and-a-half years, when at the 17th Party Congress in 2007 the pecking order of the next PBSC will be announced. The Party sees its long-term role as a defender of a communist island in a democratic sea, and it has built a foreign policy that reflects this. America's foreign policy toward China, then, should neither be built on the hypothesis that new leaders in China will on their own reform much politically or warm up in their foreign policy. Neither should America's foreign policy be built on the hope that a political rift emerges between progressives and conservatives in China's ruling party.

Therefore, America should lead other democratic states to actively pressure China to accept democratic reform, in hopes that it will propel China toward democracy, which in turn will create in China a foreign policy that will gradually blend in with that of the free world.

1) Political reform is not only the key to transform Chinese society, but also the biggest test for the new leaders of China. To this end democratic states should:

- Encourage the new leaders of China to start political reform.
- Link their human rights policies directly to political freedoms in China.
- Urge China to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as soon as possible. (This would create a new forum for the international community to press for both political reform and the improvement of the human rights situation in China.)

If China were to heed the call international community to pass the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, then the international community would need permission as well to monitor China's implementation of the covenant. Owing to the tendency in China over the last fifty years to cover-up embarrassments rather than to let scrutiny devise better solutions, it would be disastrous to trust the Chinese government to implement the covenant without a monitoring system in place.

Importantly for the democratic forces in China, if the Chinese government could be persuaded to fully implement the covenant, then democracy groups could put demands to the Chinese government forward in a legal framework based on its international obligation. Too, the international community would have a real basis to support democracy groups in China. Hence, a domestic and international battle engaged around ratifying and implementing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights might be a way to open the door for real political reform in China.

Unfortunately, it appears more and more evident that unless this framework is established, there will be no real progress made. In the speech President Hu Jintao gave on July 1, 2003, to commemorate the founding of the CCP 82 years ago, there was no mention of political reform, contrary to the optimistic forecasts some Western and Chinese observers had made. Hu bypassed an opportune time to make his mark on the nation, and this shows that the new leaders of China plan to continue business as usual. I believe history will show the fourth generation will ultimately reject two basic political reforms:

- Legalize an opposition party
- Carry out general, direct, and free elections for representatives of the People's Congress, as well as every administrative level up to and including the governorships.

However, without these basic reforms, China will not have any kind of meaningful political freedom. Therefore, democratic states need to push China for political reform on these two fundamental points: creating an opposition party and holding free elections are basic human rights.

2) Solving the North Korean crisis would create a beneficial environment for institutional transformation in China.

Stalinist North Korea is the one of the most important political allies of the CCP. China uses North Korea's military power as a strategic restraint on America and its allies. To take advantage of this currently mutually beneficial stalemate with the American government, China and North Korea have put aside their differences in order to search for common ground in their strategic interests.

For its end, out of this stalemate China would like to strengthen North Korea's Communist dictatorship. This fits China's careful strategy, much more so than stopping North Korea's nuclear blackmail. China would like to drag America and its allies into prolonged diplomatic negotiations with North Korea, thus helping North Korea win both time and increased bargaining power as they continue to reach their nuclear ambitions.

The ultimate goal of both China and North Korea is to take advantage of lengthy negotiations, allowing North Korea become a de facto nuclear power in the meanwhile. If North Korea becomes a member of the nuclear club, this will tremendously change the balance of power in East Asia -- tipping the scales irretrievably toward China and North Korea. Due to the potential aid North Korea could give to totalitarian regimes, this would be a direct encouragement to all rogue states, and good news to international terrorists. In reality, this would be a catastrophe.

The probability of solving the North Korean nuclear crisis through diplomatic means is unlikely. North Korea has repeatedly violated its previous agreements, and this bodes unwell for future agreements. The failure of the thirteen years of economic sanctions against Iraq to bring about the collapse of the government indicates the futility of imposing economic sanctions on North Korea to force it to give up its nuclear program. Furthermore, as the biggest supporter of North Korea, China is almost certain not join the sanctions.

Diplomatic negotiations and economic sanctions are necessary in certain circumstances; however, they are not decisive. America and its alliances still need to take decisive action to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program: America cannot let North Korea become a de facto nuclear power. At the same time, America needs to change the regime in North Korea, because these nuclear threats will not completely disappear until North Korea's totalitarian regime is removed from power.

A meaningful question then arises: Will China provide military support in order to save North Korea's nuclear program and its communist regime?

After the Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the East European Communist Bloc, America and its allies gained an absolute advantage in the international community. In the Gulf War in 1991, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and in Iraq today, America has demonstrated to the world that it is futile to challenge it militarily. Since the leaders in China value the most their regime, there is no reason for them to repeat the Korean War of a half-century ago. A second "War to Aid Korea and Resist U.S. Aggression" would not go any better than the first.

However, if America can somehow effectively prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons and at the same time encourage regime change, this will cause a ripple effect in China and other communist countries in Southeast Asia:

- It will show the necessity of political reform to the new leaders of China.
- Furthermore, it will encourage the democratic forces in China to hold out hope.
- It will alleviate the tough political stance China has taken toward Taiwan, and the attendant military pressure.
- It will weaken the overall power of Communism in East Asia.

3) Changing the Iranian situation will change China for the better

China and Russia are playing a worrisome game with Iran. While Russia has been providing nuclear technology to Iran, China has been providing missile technology. Both Russia and China have the same strategic interest in Iran: lies in oil-rich Central Asia and the Middle East. Moreover, it is appealing to China because it has an authoritarian government which resists pressure from America to reform. China's and Russia's enjoy a distinct ability to counter-balance American power in Central Asia and the Middle East by their policies with Iran.

China has gained a foothold in Central Asia and the Middle East since the 1990's by establishing political and economic ties with Iran, as well as cooperation with security and technology.

America and its allies, on the other hand, have ambitions to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and missiles, and at the same time they would like to support the Iranian people in their attempts to replace the repressive theocracy. If a peaceful, secular and free Iran can be established, this will change the balance of power in a number of ways:

- China will lose its most important strategic partner in Central Asia and the Middle East.
- The effectiveness of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) -- formed by China, former Central Asian communist countries, and Russia -- will be further diminished.
- It can be used as a basis for resolving the issues of rogue states like Syria, Libya, and Sudan, as well impacting the Middle East peace process, and for combating international terrorists.

4) America should strengthen its foreign policy toward China to prevent China from proliferating its weapons technology.

For a long time, China has engaged in the proliferation of technology that can be used in programs of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the sales of conventional weapons. These proliferations have been used as a strategic means to support rogue states and authoritarian regimes, as well as to counter-balance America in different parts of the world.

America needs to lead in formulating a complete, worldwide plan to guard against and attack proliferation. There needs to be better monitoring and effective sanctions for those countries who continue to proliferate. The whole world should urge China to abide by those regulations.

The time has come to increase the intensity of sanctions in order to combat China's proliferation of sensitive technology and equipment. Presently, sanctions are only imposed directly against companies in China. This is not enough. The companies engaged in proliferation are all state owned, and some of them are military enterprises. Their proliferation is neither decided at a company level, nor is it solely for the purpose of turning a profit. It is done through governmental directives, and it is part of the CCP's foreign policy. Therefore, the targets of sanctions should now begin to include the government agencies, bureaus, and etceteras that are in charge of the companies.

We should begin to cut off contact with officials from those governmental agencies; we should stop doing business and stop technical exchanges with other companies under the same umbrella; and we should encourage our democratic allies to do the same.

It is necessary for America to connect its high level diplomacy with China to China's proliferation of sensitive technology, equipment, and material. If the new leaders of China insist on proliferation, our democratic allies should also be urged to follow suit. We and our allies can reduce development aid given to China, and we can further restrict our businesses from exporting advanced technology to China, as well as suspend military exchanges with China.

We can not only force the CCP to pay a bigger economic and political price for its proliferation, but we can also negate the effects of the proliferation in other ways. This would require establishing a monitoring system capable of timely discovering, impeding, interdicting, and destroying dangerous goods which are being transfer as weapons technology.


5) America should weaken the strategic relationship between China and Russia.

China has imported advanced weapons and military technology from Russia. This has rapidly increased its overall military capability, which China in turn uses to apply increasing pressure on America and its allies in Asia. Russia in turn has expressed support to China for its plans to militarize outer space.

The strategic military cooperation China has established with Russia is detrimental to America and its allies. To counter this America should link economic aid and market opportunities specifically with a policy aimed at Russia reducing military exports to China. Even more forcefully, democratic states could press Russia to talk to China about international nuclear disarmament, as well as to cut down on its conventional forces.

Importantly, Russia should not be regarded as just a participant in Asian affairs. Instead Russia should be encouraged to engage Europe even more. This will of a matter of course align Russia closer to Europe, where it has historic ties, and prevent China from forming a tight strategic partnership with Russia in Asia.

6) There is still doubt whether China can carry out its obligations to the WTO on schedule.

The most powerful guarantee that China will carry out its obligations to the WTO will be the urging of the new leaders of China to increase the privatization of some state-owned enterprises.

A further relaxation of the restrictions private enterprises face is needed, as well as the dismantling of the monopolies that some state-owned enterprises enjoy -- that impede a fair competitive environment and restrict the flow of foreign capital and goods into China.

A communist political system will neither allow a completely privatized, free-market economy; nor will it allow private entrepreneurs or the emergent middle class to politically challenge the Party's rule. Therefore, on one hand, democratic states should not overestimate the influence that a private economy and foreign direct investment shall have in promoting freedom of China. On the other hand, democratic states should center of their China policy around an insistence of political reform and democratic transition, without waiting for economic openness to influence the political realm. ( THE END ) (boxun.com)